Before Fox and Romano, C.JJ., Collins, VC.J, Leonard and Wang, S.JJ
On Motion for Summary Judgment.
CHIEF JUSTICE EMERITUS ROMANO delivers the Unanimous Judgment of the Court.

NATHANIEL ROMANO, Chief Justice emeritus. Robbie Earl For ASM, a Registered Student Organization (RSO), filed a complaint and petition for relief alleging that the ASM Finance Committee violated due process in giving them funds which were used in a campaign on behalf of Robbie Earl, an ASM member, as a write-in candidate to the Student Council. On behalf of the Finance Committee, outgoing Chair Barb Kiernoziak moves this Court for dismissal on the grounds that this case presents no case or controversy, because the actions alleged do not violate the laws of the ASM and no relief is available to the petitioners. See, Rule 12(b), Student Judiciary Rules of Procedure (2005); Motion for Dismissal. On motions to dismiss, the Court assumes all facts as alleged by the Petitioner are true, and views any gray areas in the manner most favorable to the non-moving party.

We begin by looking at first principles. See, Schober v. Evans, 2004 ASM SJ 14; Multicultural Student Coalition v. Greenbaum, 2004 ASM SJ 9; cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The fundamental principle is that this Court can only act where there is some specific authorization to act. Schober v. Evans, supra. All of our authority stems from the grant of authority to us found in the ASM Constitution. ASM Const. Art. X, §3 (2005); Schober v. Evans, supra at 2. Specifically, for the case at bar, jurisdiction must exist as part of the general jurisdiction to hear "cases and controversies" arising under the Constitution or other laws of the ASM. ASM Const. Art. X §3(c).

Jurisdiction arises under the ASM Constitution or other laws of the ASM in one of three specific ways. Either there is a specific provision authorizing the suit or creating the cause of action, there is a specific and articulated right that is judicially enforceable, or there is some specific procedure that has been illegally bypassed. Schober v. Evans, supra, at 2-3 (citing Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986)).

The case at bar cannot be said to arise under any of those jurisdictional grants. First, there is no specific cause of action authorized in the laws of the ASM. The ASM Constitution itself creates no specific causes of action, so we must look to the ASM By-laws. Here, Petitioners are asserting an appeal of a financial decision. Under the ASM By-laws, financial decisions may only be appealed to the Student Judiciary for reasons of viewpoint neutrality violations. ASM By-laws §3.07(A)(II). Here, Petitioner has asserted no facts that could reasonably be considered to be a viewpoint neutrality action. While we have long insisted that we will read the pleading requirements quite broadly, the flipside to that proposition is that there must be some facts to support the asserted cause of action; we cannot, and will not, simply read into a pleading a cause of action that is not there. See, Rule 9(a), Student Judiciary Rules of Procedure (2005); Tenant Resource Center v. Student Services Finance Committee - Order on Joinder, 2005 SJ Ord. 1 at 2-3; Multicultural Student Coalition v. Otten - Denial of Dismissal, 2004 SJ Ord. 8 at 2. Petitioner has not alleged any facts that could reasonably give rise to a viewpoint neutrality action.

Further, the second aspect arising under jurisdiction, that of a specific right being violated, has not occurred here. The ASM Constitution guarantees specific rights in Article IV - nondiscrimination, due process, equal access and open meetings, the right of initiative, and the right of recall. None of these substantive rights has been given as the basis of the cause of action. Again, while we will not place artificial and arbitrary restrictions on the Rule 9(a) requirement of valid pleadings, we cannot judicially re-write Rule 9(a) and join causes of action not specifically plead by the Petitioner ; though we retain absolute authority to issue rules, once issued, we cannot ignore them or interpret them as though to render them void of any meaning. Richards v. Student Council, 1997 ASM SJ 1 (each word and phrase of legislation has meaning). Petitioner has not pled a violation of these substantive requirements.

Finally, a suit can also be sustained if there is some violation of due process. Schober v. Evans, supra, at 2-3. Petitioner asserts that the Finance Committee violated its due process rights somehow in awarding it monies that were later misused. This allegation, however, fails to assert a viable due process claim under the ASM Constitution.

We have never found, nor will we find here, elements of "substantive due process" within the ASM Constitution. Unlike the Federal Constitution, the ASM Constitution's due process clause contains no substantive element; it is at once broader, yet narrower than the Federal clause it parallels. Compare US Const. amend. XIV, §1 and ASM Const. Art. IV, §2. Federal due process extends to any "deprivation" of certain enumerated and unenumerated rights, while our constitution instead guarantees solely the procedural aspects of due process. Our Constitution does provide substantive guarantees, simply not in the due process clause; the only protections under due process is a requirement that before any body of ASM acts, it will establish rules to guide its act, and then, in acting, it will follow its previously established rules. The common law of ASM has long supported this distinction. See, e.g. Tenant Resource Center v. Student Services Finance Committee (I), 2004 ASM SJ 7 (SSFC required to use criteria exactly as appearing in the ASM By-laws); Baumgardner v. Courey, 2004 ASM SJ 3 (no violation where SEC Chair required student to get open records in the legally established manner); McCabe v. Evans, 2004 ASM SJ 2 (Council elections void when not done in manner prescribed by ASM By-laws).

Here, all parties agree that the process established by the Finance Committee was followed without deviation. Petitioner applied for funds and was treated as any other student organization would have been treated. The process, however flawed it might be, worked. Petitioner cannot complain to us simply because the end result of the process was not what it had intended. Indeed, if the process is flawed, which it very well might be, the proper remedy is to seek its amendment via the ordinary political process, petitioning first the Finance Committee itself and then the Student Council, which is the master of the committee. Unless the process itself inherently violates a substantive right, when we would say there was no process at all, we cannot simply invalidate a procedure when a participant does not like the outcome.

After a careful consideration of the Complaint and Petition for Relief, we must conclude that no valid cause of action has been invoked, and we therefore have no jurisdiction over the case as currently pled. Because we focus on the jurisdictional issue, we do not reach Respondent's argument of lack of meaningful relief.

Wherefore, for the reasons stated above, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissal is GRANTED to wit:

IT IS ORDERED that Summary Judgment be entered for the Respondent; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint and Petition for Relief be DISMISSED.