Timothy Schulz, David Lapidus, and Kyle Ripple, Petitioners
v.
ASM Student Judiciary, Respondent
2006
ASM SJ 3
JUDGMENT
Cite As: 2006
ASM SJ 3
Before Fox, CJ, Hodgson, VCJ, and
Moe, SJ.
Mr. Schulz for Petitioners.
Justices Leonard and Thomson for
Respondent.
CHIEF JUSTICE FOX announces the Unanimous Opinion of the Panel.
NICHOLAS J. FOX, Chief
Justice. 1. On
2. On 4 March 2006,
Timothy Schulz, David Lapidus, and Kyle Ripple, all ASM members and all
currently declared for a seat in the Spring 2006 elections, filed complaint
against the Student Judiciary alleging that the Candidacy Declaration Form is a
contract binding on all parties, including the Student Election Commission and Student
Judiciary, and therefore cannot be broken once adopted. Consequently, Petitioners argue that all
candidate declaration forms filed after the official deadline listed on the
Candidate Declaration Form should not be accepted. Complaint. There are several issues present in the case
at bar, and the Court will address them in turn.
3. The central issue
before the Court regards the Candidate Declaration Form and its binding effect
as a contract. Petitioner urges this
Court to adopt a view that the Candidate Declaration Form is a contract that is
binding on all parties, including candidates, the Student Election Commission,
and the Student Judiciary. Respondent argues that the Court's previous
caselaw has only dealt with the binding force of the contract as it applies to
the Student Election Commission.
Moreover, Respondent argues that Student Judiciary has plenary authority
over elections, Gordon v. Leonard,
2005 ASM SJ 3 (per curiam); In re: 2005
Spring Election Complaints, 2005 ASM SJ 2 (per curiam); Egan & Benishek v. Halamish & Kumar,
2003 ASM SJ 22; Dean v. Unity, 2000
ASM SJ 2. Therefore, Respondent contends
that the Student Judiciary can exercise its plenary authority at any time to
alter any election rule or contract, since the ASM Constitution gives the Student Judiciary that authority.
4. Respondent is
correct in that the Student Judiciary can exercise its plenary authority over
elections by acting as the Student Election Commission. What is important to note, though, is that
the Student Judiciary delegates its authority to the Student Election
Commission to make rules and contracts on
behalf of the Student Judiciary.
This means that when the Student Election Commission establishes an
election rule or contract, and the provisions of that rule or contract are
constitutional, the rule or contract is also binding on the Student Judiciary
since the Student Judiciary delegated its agency in the matter to the Student
Election Commission.
5. Another approach
to look at the issue would be this: if
the Student Judiciary actually acted as the Student Election Commission, as it
sometimes does, would the Court have the power to break a contract with other
parties merely because it felt like it?
The answer is certainly not. Despite
that the Court has plenary power over elections, “plenary power” does not mean
the Court can take an illegal or unconstitutional action. Once the Court or an agent working on its
behalf enters into a valid contract that is promulgated within the legal powers
of the agent, the agent and Student Judiciary are bound to enforce all
provisions of the rule or contract and cannot change those rules or contracts,
especially when the sole basis for changing the rules or contracts is a mere
substantive policy preference.
6. This does not mean
that the Student Judiciary lacks any authority to strike down any
unconstitutional rules or contractual provisions, since the rules or provisions
were illegal and therefore null and void in the first instance. Moreover, this does not mean that the Student
Judiciary cannot exercise its plenary authority over elections to change
election rules, contracts, or deadlines prior
to the official start of the campaign season (i.e. when declaration forms
become available to the public). What
this does mean is that, once declaration forms are available to the public, all
election rules and contracts established at the time are established under the
authority of the Student Judiciary via its agent (Student Election Commission),
and all constitutional provisions of those rules and contracts are binding on
all parties, including candidates, the Student Election Commission, and Student
Judiciary.
7. Respondent
contends here that the only “right” each candidate who filed a declaration form
has was a spot in the ballot, and therefore as long as that right was not
deprived in any way, there was no violation of the contract and no harm
committed. However, this Court also
believes that as a matter of procedure, all candidates have the right not only
to be placed on the ballot, but to also expect that all parties to the contract
will abide by all provisions. This is a
procedural right that all declared candidates have. It is expected as a matter of procedural due
process (infra) that the ASM bodies
operating the elections and all candidates bound by those provisions will
follow those provisions to the letter.
8. Operating under
this delegation doctrine, it is clear from the Court’s caselaw why the Student
Judiciary must be bound to enforce the deadline requirement as listed on the
Candidate Declaration Form. This Court
has consistently held that all rules and laws of the ASM must be followed to
the letter. VICE-CHIEF JUSTICE GREEN wrote for this Court, “It is important that criteria, bylaws, the ASM constitution,
committee standing rules, and all other relevant texts be followed to the
letter. This means a ‘plain reading’ of the words. Additions, subtractions, and
improvisations of the phrasing are violations [of the Constitution].” TRC v.
SSFC (I), 2004 ASM SJ 7. In essence,
in order to ensure due process, all rules and laws must be followed as they are
written on the page; any other reading which adds, detracts, or modifies what
is written on the page imposes “phantom criteria,” and thus violates the protections
of due process.
9. Respondent
contests this point arguing that the TRC
doctrine only applies to the specific situations which the individual cases
present, namely cases in the funding process.
However, the TRC doctrine as
defined in TRC v. SSFC (I), and as it
has been applied consistently since then, is that the definition of “due
process” regards due process generally and not specific due process. To take Respondent’s approach of
case-specific due process would undermine the ASM Constitution’s guarantee of procedural due process generally
because “due process” would then require different standards for different
groups. This Court has consistently held
all ASM bodies—including the Student Judiciary—to the same due process
standard: due process is ensured when an
established process that is fully constitutional is followed to the
letter. This doctrine applies to all
groups within the ASM.
10. With the TRC doctrine in mind, we begin our
analysis by examining several important cases regarding elections. The Court’s caselaw is quite clear on this
issue and need not be reiterated in-depth or at great discussion. While the ASM
Constitution § 10(3)(a) clearly gives the Student Judiciary plenary
authority over elections, and while the Student Judiciary delegates that
authority to the Student Election Commission while reserving the right to act
as the Commission whenever it deems necessary, ASM Bylaws § 6.01(A), the Student Judiciary or the Student Election
Commission has authority to take only constitutional actions regarding
elections. Gordon v. Leonard, 2005 ASM SJ 3 (per curiam).
11. In Nichols v. SEC, 2003 ASM SJ 10, the
Court noted that the Candidacy Declaration Form is a contract, and that all
persons signing said contract bind themselves to each and every provision of
that contract, provided that the provision is constitutional. This doctrine was affirmed in In Re 2005 Spring Election Cases, 2005
ASM SJ 2. Moreover, the Court noted in 2005 Spring Election Cases that, since
the Candidate Declaration Form is a contract, the Student Election Commission
and Student Judiciary, as well as all candidates, are bound by the provisions
of the contract. The Court also noted
that even if the Candidate Declaration Form was not a contract, it still had
the same legal effect as an election rule, and therefore all candidates, the
Student Election Commission, and Student Judiciary are bound by the rule.
12. It is abundantly
clear from the Candidate Declaration Form that the Student Election Commission and
Student Judiciary were bound by a contract that set the deadline to file a
declaration on
13.
Respondent argues on this point that the Student Judiciary should be
concerned with the substantive number of candidates running in an election
because it is best for the electorate to have multiple candidates with multiple
viewpoints running. The Court is not
contesting the policy argument that more candidates with a more diverse range
of perspectives is probably better overall for elections; however, it is not
the providence of this Court to be concerned with the substantive outcome of a
process. This Court is only concerned
with the procedures involved in the recruitment of candidates; we are not
concerned with how many candidates actually declare to run in the elections.
14. This
is consistent with the procedural approach of this Court in countless past
cases. The Student Judiciary has never recognized elements
of substantive due process under the ASM
Constitution; as such, the Student Judiciary only recognizes the procedural
element of due process. UWRCF v. SSFC (I), 2005 ASM SJ 11; Zyvix v. Fox, 2005 ASM SJ 8; Robbie Earl for ASM v. Finance Committee, 2005
ASM SJ 7. Consequently, as long as a
process that was duly established by the appropriate body of ASM is followed,
and as long as that process does not violate a substantive right espoused in
the ASM Constitution, Art. IV § 1, due process is considered to
be followed. The process itself may not
be ideal and may be flawed, but such imperfections are left to the political
processes to amend. Zyvix v. Fox, 2005 ASM SJ 8;
Robbie Earl for ASM v. Finance Committee, 2005 ASM SJ 7; Baumgardner v. Courey, 2004 ASM SJ
3. Indeed, in UWRCF v. SSFC (I), 2005 ASM SJ 11, the Court noted, “The Court is
concerned with procedural due process; the substantive outcome is of no
consequence.” In the case at bar,
Respondent's entire justification for suspending the deadlines is to affect the
substantive outcome of the elections, which is beyond the requirements of
procedural due process. Since the Court
has consistently rejected substantive elements in the past, we see no reason to
change our course of action now.
15. The Court also
rejects Respondent’s contention that to deny interest in the substantive
outcome of the elections necessarily implies that the Court must deny any
interest in voter turnout for the elections, since working to increase voter
turnout aims at affecting the quantitative number of students who vote. Respondent overlooks the crucial fact that
recruiting candidates to be on the ballot goes through a formal process. Encouraging the student body to get out and
vote does not. While the Court and the
Student Election Commission may be concerned with the substantive outcome of
voter turnout and candidate recruitment, it cannot break the rules or change
policy during the middle of an election season—after the rules have already
been established—merely to tinker with the numbers. If only two candidates run, or if only two
people vote, the Court is not concerned with that outcome. It may take note of the low outcome and
devise ways of improving the process in the future to obtain a more desirable result,
but as long as the current process was followed, the Court’s duty and concern
are satisfied.